Compared to western markets, listed firms in East Asia typically have low levels of information transparency and do not motivate to disclose proprietary information to the public. One of the most frequently cited reasons for the low level of transparency and disclosure quality is poor corporate governance structures in this region. In this study, we explore the association between ownership structure and voluntary information disclosure in Taiwan. Annual report index data from Information Disclosure and Transparence Ranking System (IDTRS) are used as the proxy of the firm's voluntary information. The empirical results indicate that the level of information disclosure is likely to be less in "insider" or family-controlled companies.
Introduction
Corporate disclosure has been the focus of an increasing research subject in recent years. Since Enron, corporate American has come under even greater scrutiny and increased regulation. E.g., Sarbanes Oxley is, at least in part, intended to enhance the role of corporate governance in safe guarding the quality of reported earnings and overall corporate disclosure.
With growing interests in the topic, recently researchers have attempted to examine directly whether and how corporate governance affects corporate disclosure quality in US, UK and Continental European countries (Meek et al., 1995; Turpin & DeZoort, 1998; Ball et al., 2003; Bushman et al., 2004; Khanna et al., 2004) . In contrast, very few studies have been examined with the nature and extent of corporate disclosure in Asian countries. Accordingly, this study aims to examine the corporate disclosure in Taiwan listed companies.
Corporate disclosure deserves special attention in the Asian context because firms in these countries have less incentives for transparent disclosure than US and UK markets (Ball et al., 2003) . Taiwan capital market plays an important role in Asian emerging stock market. Research made in Taiwan provides us with an opportunity to examine empirically the firm characteristics affecting corporate information disclosure in emerging economies. Further, the disclosure orientation in Asian market is also greatly influenced by the form of their ownership and management structure (Lam et al., 1994; Mok et al., 1992) . In Asian market, especially in Chinese society, listed companies are usually controlled by a family group who staff many of the senior positions and also own a large proportion of the shares. As Taiwan become one of the major international capital market, there is an increase demand from market users for more corporate disclosure for proper evaluation of firm's performance.
This study examines whether ownership structure is associated with the corporate disclosure of listed companies in Taiwan. It is also investigates whether family ownership and control of firms has an impact on the level of disclosure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the sample and research method. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Hypotheses development 2.1 Ownership structure and disclosure
Voluntary disclosure is greatly influenced by the form of the ownership and management structure (Chau & Gray, 2002; Gelb, 2000; Ho & Wong, 2001 ). Jensen and Meckling (1976) assert that when ownership and control are separated, the potential for agency costs arises because of conflicts of interests between the contracting parities (manager and shareholders). As a result, information disclosure is likely to be greater in widely held firms so that principals can effectively monitor that their economic interests are optimized and agents can signal that they act in the best interests of the owners. There is limited researches in Asian market. Hossain et al. (1994) found that ownership structure is statistically related to the level of information voluntarily disclosed by listed Malaysian companies. Thus, the analysis leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: There is a positive association between wider ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure.
Family ownership and voluntary disclosures
In Asian market, it seems that family-owned and -controlled companies are more in evidence than in western developed stock markets and that -insiders‖ control a significant proportion of listed companies (Claessens et al., 1999) . Chau and Gray (2002) argue when the ownership structure is concentrated, large institutional investors may be less concerned with voluntary disclosure, given that they have access to the information from inside. Chau and Gray have examined this relationship on Hong-Kong and Singapore firms, and found the predominance of insiders and family-controlled firms is associated with low levels of disclosures. Insiders and family-controlled firms have little motivation to disclose information in excess of mandatory requirements since the demand for public information disclosure is relatively weak in comparison with that of firms with wider share ownership. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1: There is a negative association between family or concentrated ownership and of voluntary disclosure.
Research methods 3.1 Sample and data selection
Our sample encompassed all industrial listed firms included in the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. All the 45 banking and insurance firms were excluded because they are subject to specific disclosure requirements. The final sample included 1,219 firms. The sample period was from 2005 to 2007. We selected to work on this sample period since voluntary disclosures have greatly increased in Taiwan during this time. Table 1 presents sample composition. 
Disclosure index
The voluntary disclosure checklist was based on the one developed by Taiwan For Taiwan listed companies, there is information about the proportion of shares owned by directors and dominant shareholders, as this is a required disclosure by Taiwan Stock Exchange (TWSE). The ownership variable in this study was calculated by adding together the proportions of equity belonging to directors and to dominant shareholders to arrive at the proportion of a firm's equity owned by insiders.
Furthermore, Chen and Jaggi (2000) show that the larger the proportion of outsiders, the more effective will be the monitoring of voluntary financial disclosures.
Regression model
Prior studies have identified various attributes, such as size and performance, that affect firms' disclosures and thus, the results presented in the previous section may be influenced by these attributes. Accordingly, we estimate a multivariate OLS regression equation to examine how the level of control party affects a firm's disclosures. The analysis of voluntary disclosure was based on the following multiple regression model: Table 3 presents information about the sample companies in terms of the independent and control variables. The proportion of equity owned by the external compared with the insiders (directors and dominant shareholders) was 0.609, 0.610 and 0.588 from 2005 to 2007 respectively. A further analysis of the biographical details of the directors of sample companies indicated that the family relationships were among the directors and senior management staff. Based on the family relationships, a further analysis of the shareholdings among the family members revealed that more than half of the listed companies were subject to family control (i.e., one family group of shareholders own 50% or more of the issued share capital). 2 Total liabilities over total assets 3 Auditor opinion, 2 for adverse opinion; 1 for qualified opinion; 0 for disclaimer opinion and -1 for unqualified opinion. 4 Ratio of a firm's equity owned by outsiders to all equity of the firms. 5 Net profit after tax and preferred stock dividend over weighted average published shares Table 4 Source: TSFEC Table 5 indicates that the level of overall disclosure is significant at the 0.01 level, the F value of 27.484. The adjusted coefficient of determination (R 2 ) for the level of overall disclosure is 50.9%. Thus, these multiple regression models are highly significant and have an explanatory power similar to those reported in earlier studies (Cook, 1991) . The amount of explained variation in disclosure range from 65.3% for finance and operation transparence; 7.9% for board and ownership structure; 16.6% for mandatory information; 2.2% for voluntary information. The use of this statistical tool is based on the assumptions of no significant multicollinearity between the explanatory variables, and conditions of linearity and normality. Multicollinearity does not appear to be affecting the reported results. Hair et al. (1995) indicate that very large VIF values indicate high collinearity and a common cutoff threshold is VIF values above 10. The variance inflation factor (VIF) in all the regression tests is lower than 10 for any of the independent variables. As shown in Table 5 , the coefficients for ownership structure of Taiwan listed companies are significant (p<.01) for total information and board & ownership structure. The coefficients are also significant (p<.05) for all other subgroup information. These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 1 that there is a positive association between wider ownership and the extent of voluntary disclosure. The coefficient for EPS is significant (p<.1) for board & ownership structure which reveals that earning voluntary disclosures is associated with ownership structure. This finding is consistent with Chen and Jaggi's (2000). Further analysis of the shareholdings among the family members of the sample companies from 2005-2007 reveals that more one third of the listed companies are subject to family control. In order to analyze the impact of family control on voluntary disclosures, another regression model was run with the same variables as in Table 5 , but with an added indictor variable for family control as shown in Table 6 . As shown in Table 6 , the coefficient on OOWN remains significantly positive, and the coefficient on the proportion owned by family members is negative and statistically significant (p<.01) for mandatory, voluntary and total information disclosures. This indicates that while concentrated ownership in general reduces disclosure that effect is particularly pronounced when the firm is family-controlled. Gray's (1988) secrecy hypoethesis also argues that where a firm's shares are held by family-control, there is a preference for confidentiality and restriction of disclosure of information about the business only to those who are closely involved with its management and financing. Thus, the findings of this study support Hypothesis 2 that there is a negative association between family ownership and voluntary disclosures. The estimated coefficients and two-tailed p-values (in parentheses). 1 Natural logarithm of total assets. 2 Total liabilities over total assets 3 Auditor opinion, 2 for adverse opinion; 1 for qualified opinion; 0 for disclaimer opinion and -1 for unqualified opinion. 4 Ratio of a firm's equity owned by outsiders to all equity of the firms. 5 Earnings per share. *Significant at 0.1 **Significant at 0.05 ***Significant at 0.01 *Significant at 0.1, **Significant at 0.05, ***Significant at 0.01
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Conclusion
As the features of the emerging capitalism in East Asia is becoming more distinct, it is clear that controlling shareholders will play a key role in corporate structure and governance for the foreseeable future.
Family firms have incentive to reduce the transparency of corporate governance practices to facilitate getting family members on boards without interference from non-family shareholders. Consistent with this argument, we find that family firms tend to disclose less information than those wide shareholder firms.
The empirical findings highlight the importance of the contextual characteristics of Taiwan. The strong prevalence of -insider‖ and family-controlled companies is likely to be associated with lower levels of disclosure. Insider and family-controlled companies have little motivation to disclose information in excess of mandatory requirements because the demand for public information disclosure is relatively weak in comparison with that of companies with wider share ownership. These findings have important implications for national regulatory process that regulators should consider differences of control party settings in ownership structure prior to establishing rules for corporate disclosures.
